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Abstract：We provide a simple model to investigate the incentive of investing in R&D in a mixed 
duopoly market. We assume that the public firm has higher extent of research inefficiency, and the 
result shows that the public firm’s level of R&D is negatively correlated to the extent of privatization 
and research inefficiency. When the extent of privatization and the public firm’s R&D inefficiency 
level is relatively low, the public firm engage in more R&D compared with the private firm, and vice 
versa. This research is closely related to the policy of extensive industry transition of privatization 
in China.
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１　Introduction
　We consider a duopoly market in which a partial 
privatization firm competes with a private firm in 
a homogeneous good. We compared the level of 
R&D (research and development) between the two 
firms. Heywood and Ye (2009) discussed the same 
problem and they showed that the public firm (partial 
privatization firm) invests more in R&D than its 
private rival, by assuming the research inefficiency 
is same for both firms. However, we assume that the 
public firm has higher extent of research inefficiency, 
which is common assumption. And this phenomena 
that a public is more inefficient than a private firm 
in China is obvious. In such assumption, we find 
that only when the extent of privatization and the 
public firm’s R&D inefficiency level is relatively 
low, the public firm engage in more R&D compared 
with the private firm, and vice versa. This result 
can be explained by the empirical previous research 
of Wu (2012), where he proved that state owned 
enterprises have greater incentives for more R&D 
investment. According to his words, the reason could 
be explained that large public firms often have easy 
access to resources such as physical assets, human 
capital, availability of finance and connections with 
various government departments.
　However, keeping on of the two factors, either 
the extent of privatization or the public firm’s R&D 
inefficiency level constant, increasing the other factor 
will cause the private firm to invest more than the 
public firm. Hence, the relatively high level of the 
extent of privatization or the public firm’s R&D 
inefficiency would weaken the incentive of the public 
firm to invest more in R&D. This result has not been 
touched on in the existing researches.
　The result suggests that if the public firm has less 
R&D inefficiency level, the policy in China of industry 
transition, which targets for extensive privatization 
should be reconsidered. For example, in China the 
information technology industry is a mixed oligopoly 
market with Lenovo, Huawei and TCL. According 
to Heywood and Ye (2009), Lenovo is a public 
firm, Huawei is a private firm and TCL is partially 
privatized. R&D investment for Lenovo was the 
biggest in 2006. Lenovo has been mentioned its high 
efficiency for countless times in media. In such case, 
the privatization policy might need be reconsidered.
　We discuss our topic in 5 sections. In the first 
section, we provide an introduction. We then give the 
model and analysis in the second and third section, 
respectively. Then we offer an extension.
Finally, we present a conclusion.
２　The Model
　We consider a duopoly market consisting of a 
private firm (F1) and a public firm (state-owned firm 
F2) producing a homogeneous product. Firms produce 
with the same constant unit cost c of production, 
which is equal or greater than 0. Each firm i (i = 1,2) 
sets its sales qi and thus the inverse demand function 
is given by p = 1 − Q, where p denotes price and Q is 
the total production level, i.e., the sum of both firms’ 
outputs (Q = q1 + q2). Each firm engages in R&D, 
saying xi (i = 1,2), respectively.
　Firms’ profit functions are represented as:
πi = （1−q1−q2−c + xi）qi−Aixi
2　i ∈{1,2} （1）
where Ai is the inefficiency parameter of R&D for 
firms.
　The social welfare W is as following:
  （2）
　Firm 1 intends to maximize the profit. However, 
firm 2 which is a public or partially privatized firm 
intends to maximize the following:
 G = （1 − λ）W + λπ2 （3）
　Where 0 < λ < 1 and represents the extent of 
privatization. As λ increases, firm 2 is more willing 
to maximize the profit rather than the social welfare.
　We consider a four-stage game. In the first stage, 
the public firm 2 chooses the extent of privatization, 
λ, to maximize its G. In the second stage, firm 1 
chooses its level of R&D as a Stackelberg leader. In 
the third stage, firm 2 decides its level of R&D as a 
Stackelberg follower. In the last stage, firms compete 
in quantities.
３　Analysis
　We start our analysis from the last stage, the profit 
maximization for the firms are as follows:
 （4）
 （5）
　We obtain the outcome as following:
 （6）
 （7）
As regards R&D setting of firm 2 at stage 3, by 
substituting of （6）（7）, then we have:
 （8）
　 At stage 2, by substituting of （6）（7）（8）, after 
maximization, we obtain as:
 （9）
　 For simplicity of calculation, we assume A1 = 1, 
c = 0. Then we obtain the equilibriums:
 （10）
 （11）
 （12）
 （13）
 （14）
 （15）
 （16）
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To ensure all equilibriums to be positive, we found 
the area where x2 < x1 as Fig. 1
(Figure 1)
４　Extension
　We next consider firms choose the the level of 
R&D simultaneously. Then the two firms engage 
in a three-stage game. At stage 1, the public firm 2 
chooses the extent of privatization, λ, to maximize 
its G. At stage 2, firm 1 and firm 2 chooses its level 
of R&D simultaneously. At the last stage, firms 
set outputs quantities simultaneously in a Cournot 
competition.
　In the last stage, the profit maximization for the 
firms are same in the last section. Therefore we 
consider form stage 2. By substituting of （6）（7）, then 
we have:
 （17）
 （18）
For simplicity of calculation, we assume A1 = 1, c = 0. 
Then we obtain the equilibriums:
 （19）
 （20）
 （21）
 （22）
 （23）
 （24）
 （25）
　To ensure all equilibriums to be positive, we find 
that x1 < x2 if (1 + 3λ) / (2λ + 4λ
2) < A2 < (1 + λ) 
/ (2λ) and x2 < x1 if A2 > (1 + λ) / (2λ).
５　Conclusion
　Our results show that the public firm’s level 
of R&D is negatively correlated to the extent of 
privatization and research inefficiency. When the 
extent of privatization and the public firm’s R&D 
inefficiency level is relatively low, the public firm 
engage in more R&D compared with the private 
firm, and vice versa. This theoretical analysis is a 
correspondence of the current situation of some 
Chinese industries such as information technology. 
And our results question the Chinese policy about 
the transition of the industry targeting for extensive 
privatization.
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